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4 Abstract
This paper examines the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
reforms on employment outcomes in Croatia, testing the available theoretical pre-
dictions of partial labour market reforms from the literature. With a push from the 
EU accession, the reforms liberalised employment protection provisions for both 
temporary (2013) and permanent (2014) contracts at the end of the six-year long 
recession thus presenting a distinctive case for policy evaluation. Using Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) data in the period 2007-2017 and applying the event study 
method in combination with probit regressions, the main results suggest that EPL 
reforms from 2013 and 2014 induced a rise in temporary employment, while the 
effects on overall employment are clearly visible only in the case of the second 
reform. Moreover, probit regression estimations show that specific groups of the 
population – females, youths, foreigners, the low-skilled and singles from rural 
areas – have a higher probability of ending up with temporary contracts, suggest-
ing there is a segmentation on the Croatian labour market. 
Keywords: employment protection, reform, recession, temporary employment, 
policy evaluation, Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION
Easing of employment protection has long been advocated as a way to combat 
high unemployment, especially at the European level. However, empirical evi-
dence on the effects of labour marker flexibilisation on increasing overall employ-
ment is not very convincing. One of the reasons for this might be that flexibilisa-
tion or liberalisation of labour market legislation has occurred only at the margin, 
that is, most of the employment protection reforms eased restrictions on the use of 
temporary contracts while restrictions regarding permanent contracts remained 
unchanged. This led to distortions on the labour market by encouraging employers 
to substitute temporary for permanent workers thus creating the so-called dual 
labour market. 
Although temporary contracts are often seen as a natural way of entering the labour 
market – or as a stepping-stone to permanent employment – and a way to stimulate 
job creation and reduce unemployment, both theoretical and empirical literature 
have shown that this is not necessarily the case, but instead that temporary are often 
substituted for permanent contracts thus increasing worker turnover and possibly 
even causing a rise in non-employment (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Kahn, 2010; 
Sala, Silva and Toledo, 2012; Tejada, 2017). In addition, a higher incidence of 
temporary employment also seems to reduce labour productivity and aggregate 
welfare (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Cahuc, 
Charlot and Malherbet, 2016; Hijzen, Mondauto and Scarpetta, 2017). On the other 
hand, the literature has clearly shown that some specific groups of workers – 
including women, young, less educated, and less-skilled workers – are more often 
employed on temporary contracts (Kahn, 2007). It has also been shown that tem-
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5on these jobs are in principle less satisfied (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Booth, 
Francesconi and Frank, 2002a; Barbieri and Cutuli, 2018).
There is ample evidence of distorting effects of partial or two-tier labour market 
reforms for more advanced countries; however, empirical analysis for Eastern 
European and other emerging market countries is still rather scarce. This is espe-
cially true in the case of the newest EU member state – Croatia. Even though there 
are some works that categorize the Croatian labour market as dual (e.g., Franičević, 
2011; Brkić, 2015), and even some that try to assess the impact of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) on labour market outcomes empirically (Tomić and 
Domadenik, 2012; Matković, 2013), no sound analysis of the direct impact of 
recent labour market legislation reforms on the Croatian labour market is available. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to discover possible effects that employment protec-
tion legislation reforms have had on labour market outcomes in Croatia. By apply-
ing probability regression models and the event study approach to micro data from 
the Croatian Labour Force Survey (LFS) in the period 2007-2017 it seeks to show 
whether the EPL reforms from 2013 and 2014 increased the incidence of temporary 
employment that occurred after that. Given that the reforms might have actually 
been completely exogenously determined by the need to harmonise Croatian labour 
market regulations with those of the EU, they do present a distinctive case for 
policy evaluation. As both reforms were aimed at flexibilisation of the employment 
protection, their effects on the overall employment are also investigated.
Croatia presents an interesting case to study for several reasons. First, EPL in 
Croatia has been considered as overly rigid for most of the post-transition period, 
often being blamed for the rather sluggish labour market. Second, the recession in 
Croatia lasted for six full years and revealed many weaknesses of the labour mar-
ket, including downward wage rigidity as the labour market crisis adjustment was 
mainly effectuated through cuts in employment. Third, EU accession happened in 
the midst of the recession, and actually led to changes in, among other things, 
labour legislation. In June 2013 temporary contracts and provisions regulating 
collective dismissals were liberalized, while in July 2014 a new law liberalized the 
provisions on permanent contracts. Finally, other features of the Croatian econ-
omy, such as its seasonal character or the high importance of the public sector, 
make an investigation of the impact of employment protection legislation changes 
on labour market outcomes additionally worthwhile.
There are several contributions of this paper. Firstly, available theoretical predic-
tions of the impact of two-tier labour market reforms on labour market outcomes 
are empirically tested on a new country case that has some specific features not 
available in previous studies. Secondly, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
time the event study method is being applied to analyse the impact of EPL reform 
on labour market outcomes. Event study models are more frequently used in finan-
cial econometrics and only recently does applied microeconometrics literature 
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6 and welfare outcomes (e.g., Simon, 2016; Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch, 2018; Perez-
Truglia, 2019) - not, however, in the studies on EPL reforms. Further, as evidence-
based policy is notable for its absence in Croatia and given that with the EU acces-
sion numerous legal provisions needed to be changed, this paper provides a valu-
able contribution to the national policy evaluation literature. Finally, since EU 
accession not only coincided with the reforms, but served as a ‘push factor’ to enact 
the labour legislation liberalisation, lessons learned in the case of Croatia might be 
valuable for candidate and future accession countries as well.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
relevant studies in the literature covering the main issues related to the effects of 
labour legislation – and especially partial employment protection legislation 
reforms – on labour market outcomes at the European level. This section also 
touches upon some of the works related to segmentation on the Croatian labour 
market, while the section after that describes the labour market and institutional 
context in Croatia more thoroughly, concentrating particularly on the period 
between 2007 and 2017. Section four provides a description of the data used and 
the main empirical strategy, discussing possible shortcomings and ways to deal 
with them while drawing on the findings from the literature. The fifth section pre-
sents the main results, including the event study analysis but also probability 
regression (probit) estimations with sensitivity analyses that assess several differ-
ent model specifications in order to further discuss the results obtained and to test 
the robustness of the presented estimations. Finally, the concluding section pro-
vides a brief summary of the main findings and goes on to discuss some of the 
limitations of the paper, with suggestions for future work.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
The impact of employment protection on labour market outcomes has attracted a 
lot of attention in the economic literature. Earlier studies actually put rigid employ-
ment protection at the forefront of the reasons for high unemployment in Europe, 
especially in comparison with the US (e.g., Nickell, 1997 or Siebert, 1997). How-
ever, the negative effects of rigid EPL on (un)employment have never been 
entirely confirmed in the literature (Piton and Rycx, 2018; Bentolila, Dolado and 
Jimeno, 2019) since strict employment protection not only reduces the job destruc-
tion rate, but it also – because of expected future firing costs – decreases the job 
creation rate, thus possibly not changing or even increasing unemployment levels. 
Nevertheless, many European countries have tried to boost their labour markets 
by liberalising their labour legislation. 
However, most countries approached the problem of high unemployment and rigid 
labour legislation by relaxing only those provisions related to temporary employ-
ment while restrictions regarding permanent contracts remained mostly unchanged 
(Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 2019), i.e., European countries have conducted 
reform ‘at the margin’ or they have introduced what is called ‘selective flexibilisa-
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7sions between labour market insiders and outsiders (Eichhorst and Marx, 2019), 
but it has also introduced additional distortions on the European labour markets, 
including higher job turnover, loss of productivity and, as expected, higher inci-
dence of temporary employment, while the effect on reducing unemployment has 
not been confirmed. Therefore, some more recent studies (e.g., Boeri, 2011 or Cen-
teno and Novo, 2012), emphasize that it is not the EPL as such that is the main issue 
for European labour markets anymore; it is the two-tier or dual labour market that 
has arisen as a consequence of the partial employment protection reforms1.
A number of works in the literature in the past two decades developed theoretical 
models that help in explaining labour market outcomes of the partial EPL reforms. 
These include, among others, articles by Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc 
and Postel-Vinay (2002), Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), Sala, Silva and Toledo 
(2012), Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2016) and Tejada (2017), while Bentolila, 
Dolado and Jimeno (2019) recently provided a nice overview of both theoretical 
and empirical findings. Blanchard and Landier (2002), for example – in the case 
of temporary contracts liberalisation without any change in the costs for regular 
jobs – predict two main effects: firms will be more likely to hire new workers on 
temporary contracts to learn about their productivity but they will also be less 
likely to keep them in regular jobs. They test the model on the French data for 
young workers and show that the reforms have increased turnover, without a sig-
nificant reduction in unemployment duration, while the effect on welfare appears 
to have been negative (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). The Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002) matching model suggests that the higher the firing costs, the lower 
the share of temporary jobs transformed into permanent jobs, thus increasing 
unemployment and reducing aggregate welfare. 
Empirical studies of the partial EPL reforms differ in having either a macro or a 
micro approach, but also in conducting multi-country or single-country analyses. 
For example, Kahn (2007; 2010) argues that a micro-approach is more appropri-
ate in this context and provides important empirical findings in a multi-country 
environment. In his 2007 paper, he finds that more stringent EPL (for permanent 
contracts) for seven advanced economies increases relative non-employment rates 
for youth, immigrants, and women, whereas it also increases the incidence of 
temporary employment for the low-skilled, youth, and both native and especially 
immigrant women (Kahn, 2007). In Kahn (2010), the author finds that policies 
making it easier to create temporary jobs on average raise the likelihood that 
workers will be in temporary jobs by encouraging a substitution of temporary for 
permanent work in a sample of nine European countries. On the other hand, there 
is some evidence in his work that reducing restrictions (costs) on permanent con-
tracts can have a positive impact on increasing employment or at least decreasing 
the risk of temporary employment (Kahn, 2010).
1 See Saint-Paul (1996), Boeri (2011) or Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2019) for synthesis reports on dual-
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8 Though valuable, multi-country studies often cannot discriminate among some 
country-specific factors or establish a valid control group (Fuest, Peichl and Sie-
gloch, 2018), and thus single-country articles that focus on partial EPL reforms 
have increasingly emerged in recent years. These include, for example, Centeno 
and Novo (2012) for Portugal, Messe and Rouland (2014) for France, Vodopivec, 
Laporsek nad Vodopivec (2016) for Slovenia, and Hijzen, Mondauto and Scar-
petta (2017) for Italy. In an analysis of the Portuguese labour legislation reform 
from 2004, Centeno and Novo (2012) find that the share of fixed-term contracts, 
along with excess turnover, has increased in firms with 11 to 20 workers as the 
reform increased the protection of open-ended employment for workers in those 
firms. Given the different levels of protection for workers of different ages in 
France, i.e., protection being more stringent for firms laying off workers aged over 
50, Messe and Rouland (2014) analyse the effects of age-specific employment 
protection reform from 1999 – which increased the costs only for large firms – and 
find a substantial positive effect of the reform on firms’ incentives to provide train-
ing. Vodopivec, Laporsek nad Vodopivec (2016) find that the 2013 reform in Slo-
venia – which increased the protection of fixed-term contracts while it decreased 
the protection of permanent contracts – reduced segmentation on the Slovenian 
labour market and also increased the probability of permanent employment. Sim-
ilar to Messe and Rouland’s (2014) study for France, Hijzen, Mondauto and Scar-
petta (2017) explore different levels of employment protection related to firm size 
on temporary employment in Italy and find that stronger employment protection 
in larger firms increases worker turnover as well as the incidence of temporary 
employment, while it tends to reduce labour productivity.
Segmentation or duality of the Croatian labour market has been discussed in the 
literature for quite some time; however, mostly at a descriptive level (e.g., Račić, 
Babić and Podrug, 2005; Franičević, 2011; or Brkić, 2015). Nevertheless, there 
have been two attempts to empirically test the effects of (rigid) labour legislation 
on labour market outcomes in Croatia. The first is the paper by Tomić and Domad-
enik (2012) in which the authors show that in the period 1996-2006 there was an 
adverse selection on the Croatian labour market due to high dismissal costs; how-
ever, they also show that educational attainment is of greater relevance for employ-
ment and conclude that the impact of firing costs on employment probabilities 
decreased after the legislative reform in 2003. In the second paper, Matković 
(2013) examines the “flexicurity” concept in the context of regulatory changes 
introduced in the early 2000s and suggests that the growth of fixed-term employ-
ment slowed and positioned Croatia just below the EU average after the reforms. 
Additional empirical analysis indicates that the incidence of temporary employ-
ment falls mostly on low-skilled and low-paid jobs (Matković, 2013). The present 
paper tries to fill in the gap in the literature on the impact of EPL on labour market 
outcomes in Croatia by empirically testing the theoretical propositions of (partial) 
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93 CROATIA: LABOUR MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
After the turbulent 1990s, the Croatian labour market finally stabilized in the first 
half of the 2000s. However, the global financial and economic crisis revealed all 
the weaknesses of the Croatian economy. Although it began only in 2009 in Croa-
tia, the recession lasted for six full years with enormous consequences for the 
labour market (Figure 1). The employment level fell strongly, with some evidence 
(World Bank, 2010; Franičević, 2011) suggesting that in the early stages this was 
mainly done through temporary contracts2. Vukšić (2014) further emphasizes that 
labour market adjustment in the crisis happened through cuts in employment in 
the private sector3, primarily in male-dominated sectors, with decreasing share of 
youth employment but the rising significance of temporary and part-time employ-
ment after 2011. 
Figure 1 




























































While the economy started to recover at the end of 2014 employment levels are 
still well below those in 2007/20084. On the other hand, the share of temporary 
employment among employees has risen to new record levels of over 20% in 2017 
in comparison to about 12-14% in the pre-crisis and (early) crisis period, while the 
incidence of precarious employment (“contracts up to three months”) has been the 
highest among EU countries ever since 2013 (7.1% of all employees in 2017). 
Interestingly, although the literature predicts an increase of temporary contracts 
during a recession (Kahn, 2010), such contracts were much more in evidence with 
the start of the recovery in Croatia. At the same time, the average share of self- 
2 Matković (2013) finds that in the pre-crisis period temporary contracts were more frequently used in the 
peripheral part of the private sector for hiring young workers and low-skilled workers in routine manual and 
service occupations.
3 As often argued, due to downward wage rigidity labour market adjustments in the crisis happened through 
employment cuts. The literature suggests that the effects of EPL on temporary employment are actually strong-
er in countries that exhibit more downward wage rigidity (Kahn, 2007). 
4 A part of the underlying reason is the decline of the working-age population and a change in generational 
composition of the workforce due to population ageing. Nevertheless, the employment rate surpassed (by a 
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10 employed persons, 19% in the pre-crisis and early crisis period (2007-2011), stood 
at only 11% in 2017 (Figure 2). This indicates that the patterns of employment 
have somewhat changed in the aftermath of the recession in Croatia (Figure 1).
At the same time, during most of the post-transition period Croatian labour legis-
lation has been considered to be particularly rigid, and is often denounced as the 
main culprit for the bad situation on the labour market (Rutkowski, 2003; Tomić 
and Domadenik, 2012). Although with the amendments to the law introduced in 
2003 labour legislation in Croatia was somewhat liberalised, the overall employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) index remained above the EU and OECD aver-
age (Matković and Biondić 2003). The new labour act enacted in 2009 did not 
bring any substantial changes in ‘flexibilisation’ provisions, i.e., the EPL index 
remained unchanged (Tomić, 2013; Potočnjak, 2014). 
However, EU accession in July 2013 brought to two new reforms of labour legis-
lation in a short amount of time. Amendments to the existing Labour Act that 
introduced liberalisation of employment protection for temporary contracts (EPT) 
and employment protection against collective dismissals (EPC) were introduced 
in June 20135, the main purpose being not only to increase labour market flexibil-
ity but actually to harmonise the Croatian labour market regulations with those of 
the EU (Kunovac, 2014; Potočnjak, 2014). Part of legislation regarding regular 
contracts (EPR) has been left unchanged in this instance6. However, as soon as in 
the following year (July 2014)7 the passage of a new Labour Act was enforced by 
the need to further harmonise the national legislation with that in the EU 
(Potočnjak, 2014). This act introduced liberalisation of employment protection for 
regular contracts (EPR)8 and further liberalisation of employment protection 
against collective dismissals (EPC). Employment protection index for temporary 
contracts (EPT) has been left unchanged on this occasion, despite some changes 
regarding liberalisation in the area of temporary employment agencies9. 
Table 1 sums up the recent employment protection legislation changes using the 
OECD’s indicators for employment protection for regular contracts, collective 
dismissals and temporary contracts10. Although some of the new provisions did 
5 Act on Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 73/2013) was passed on 18 June 2013 (in force after 8 days).
6 The main changes of the law in 2013 were that it introduced the possibility that the first fixed-term contract 
lasts longer than three years (concluding more successive employment contracts remains limited to a maxi-
mum of three years), while the provisions on collective surpluses of workers have been simplified and the 
whole process was shortened.
7 Labour Act (OG 93/2014) was passed on 30 July 2014 (in force after 8 days).
8 The main changes in this regard have been the simplification of procedures when firing workers on perma-
nent contracts (the abolition of the provisions regarding the obligatory retraining or displacement to another 
job before the dismissal), changes in the organisation of work with respect to working hours, plus potential 
lowering of the firing costs as the compensation for termination of employment contract in court has been 
reduced from a maximum of 18 to a maximum of 8 average wages. 
9 The possibility of working via a temporary agency has been increased from one to three years. However, 
fewer than 1% of workers are employed through temporary agency, without significant changes in recent years.
10 More details on EPL reforms in Croatia in 2013 and 2014 can be found in Kunovac (2014), CNB (2104), 
Potočnjak (2014) and Brkić (2015), and additional information on previous reforms can be found in Matković 
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11induce changes in the relevant indices, the general impression has been that the 
scope of the reforms implemented is rather limited, thus the need for labour mar-
ket reform has remained (CNB, 2014; Potočnjak, 2014).
Table 1 
EPL reforms in Croatia
2008 2013 2014
EP for regular contracts (EPR) 2.55 2.55 2.28
EP against collective dismissals (EPC) 3.75 3.00 2.25
EP for temporary contracts (EPT) 2.21 1.96 1.96
EP for regular open-ended contracts including 
collective dismissals (EPRC) 2.89 2.68 2.27
Ratio of EPT and EPR 0.87 0.77 0.86
Ratio of EPT and EPRC 0.76 0.73 0.86
Notes: Values represent EPL indices based on OECD methodology.
Source: Kunovac (2014) and CNB (2014).
Therefore, labour legislation liberalisation, though advocated by the business 
community and many experts in the field for quite some time, happened in parallel 
with (a ‘push’ from) the EU accession, but also at the end of the six-year long 
recession and some other policy reforms that might have influenced the employ-
ment patterns; for example, vocational training without commencing employment 
for youth population11 or seasonal employment in agriculture via vouchers12. In 
addition, as of 2015 there is the possibility for an employer who hires a young 
person up to the age of 30 on a permanent (open-ended) contract to be exempted 
from paying employer’s contributions for up to five years13. In the following sec-
tions I will try to determine if and how employment protection legislation changes 
actually affected labour market outcomes in Croatia.
4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
4.1 METHODS
Since the main research question of this paper examines the effect of employment 
protection reform(s) on the incidence of temporary employment and overall level 
of employment, the natural approach would be to use some of the standard policy 
evaluation methods, such as differences-in-differences or some of the matching 
methods. However, as the policy reforms are all-encompassing in this case, i.e., 
changes in labour legislation provisions have a potential effect not only for the 
employed population but for the entire population that might get employment; the 
11 See Tomić and Žilić (2018) for more details about this. For example, they report that the number of partici-
pants in the programme increased from below 500 in 2010 to 33,366 in 2016.
12 Both vocational training without commencing employment (up to a year) and seasonal work in agriculture 
via vouchers (up to 90 days over the year) have been introduced by the Law on the Promotion of Employment 
(OG 57/2012, 120/2012, 16/2017).
13 According to the Law on Social Security Contributions (OG 84/2008, 152/2008, 94/2009, 18/2011, 22/2012, 
144/2012, 148/2013, 41/2014, 143/2014, 115/2016, 106/2018). The Croatian Pension Insurance Institute reports 
that the number of people using this possibility for employment increased from slightly more than 10,000 in 
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12 identification of the credible treatment group is somewhat difficult. Similarly, if 
one would like to apply some other impact evaluation method such as regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) it would need to have the treatment or running vari-
able, which in this case is time; yet again, this is not unique for a person but 
instead applies to all potential participants on the labour market. Still, the effects 
of the employment protection reform(s) on the incidence of temporary employ-
ment might be viewed as an intention-to-treat (ITT) case, as the reform represents 
a treatment offer even if it doesn’t lead to temporary contracts in all cases. 
In order to avoid the aforementioned issues, this paper relies on a somewhat dif-
ferent approach in analysing the effects of labour legislation reforms on employ-
ment outcomes in Croatia. That is, I adapt models used in the works by Kahn 
(2007; 2010), which apply different probability models in the investigation of the 
effects of  EPL reforms on employment in a multi-country environment. In essence, 
the following models are being estimated:
  (1.1)
  (1.2)
where TEMPit is a dummy variable indicating that a person i is employed on a 
temporary contract in month t and EMPit is a dummy variable if a person i is 
employed (an employee) in month t. EPL_reform indicates a reform variable, 
which is added to the basic set of covariates (Xit) to take into account the EPL 
reforms from 2013 and 2014, while ωit represents time effect.
Essentially, the determinants of being employed (an employee) and temporarily 
employed (eq. 1 and 2) are estimated in a set of probit (a maximum likelihood 
estimator) regressions, i.e.,
  (2)
where Yi is an outcome equal to 1 if a person is a temporary employee, Xi presents 
a set of individual, household, area and job characteristics14, Φ is a standard nor-
mal cumulative distribution function which translates discrete values of Yi* (indi-
vidual’s underlying probability for employment/temporary employment status, 
which is an unobserved (latent) variable) to a probability (Pr) for observing the 
event Yi  = 1 given covariates, and β is the main parameter of interest15.
14 See the next subsection and Table A1 in the Appendix for more details.
15 I also test for non-random selection of individuals into (temporary) employment by applying the so-called 
Heckman correction for selection, i.e., I estimate the model in two stages where in the first stage the proba-
bility of a person being employed (or economically active) is estimated, which is then used as an adjustment 
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13Besides the set of individual, household and area characteristics I add reform var-
iables in the model for both temporary and permanent contracts. One way to 
account for labour legislation reforms is to include the value of the OECD’s 
employment protection legislation indices (Table 1) in different time-periods (as 
in Kahn, 2007), while the other possibility is to simply include dummy variables 
for the period when reforms were in place (as in Kahn, 2010). Given that the lit-
erature suggests that what affects the incidence of temporary employment is the 
rigidity of the protection of permanent employment relative to that of temporary 
and not the temporary (or permanent) protection legislation itself (Blanchard and 
Landier, 2002; Kahn, 2010; Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 2019), I estimate the 
models having both temporary and permanent reform variables in the same speci-
fication. However, models including only one of the reform (dummy) variables 
are also estimated, having in mind that the second reform (EPR from July 2014) 
happened on top of the first one (EPT from June 2013). I additionally account for 
the possible endogeneity of the EPL reforms by adding time trend, regional dum-
mies and quarterly GDP growth rates in the model. This should also control for the 
state of the economy16. 
In order to establish a flat pre-reform trend, i.e., constant probability of temporary 
employment before the reform(s), I apply the event study in this paper. Although 
this method is more commonly used in financial econometrics, i.e., in estimating 
the impact of an event on the value of a firm, it has also been used recently in 
applied microeconometrics analysing different aspects of (policy) reform on labour 
market and welfare outcomes (e.g., Simon, 2016; Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch, 2018; 
Perez-Truglia, 2019), but not, to the best of my knowledge, in any estimation of the 
effects of labour legislation reform on labour market outcomes. In principle, event 
time dummies replace the treatment variable in the regression model. This would 
mean that I estimate the equation (1.1) or (1.2) where instead of the reform variable 
(EPL_reform) I have a set of dummy variables indicating number of periods away 
(before and after) from a labour legislation reform (an event), or:
  (3.1)
  (3.2) 
where  is a vector of dichotomous indicators each of which is equal to 
one when an observation is j periods away from some discrete policy event 
(Simon, 2016), that is, from EPL policy reform (June 2013 or July 2014) in this 
case. If the incidence of temporary employment changed sharply around the time 
of the event (EPL reform) β parameters for the periods prior to the event should be 
equal (around) zero while β parameters for the periods after the event should be 
16 Linear trends should also help account for differences in pre-trends in the incidence of temporary employ-
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14 larger than zero. Accordingly, one would expect that the same parameters are 
equal to (around) zero for all j-periods (before and after) away from the reform in 
the case of some other outcome variable not affected by the EPL reform. I use the 
time (month and year) of the contract for each person in the sample in order to link 
the event to a specific person outcome and trace it back to 24 months (8 quarters) 
before the reform and 24 months (8 quarters) after the reform17. 
4.2 DATA
Key information in this paper is taken from the Croatian Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) microdata in the period 2007-2017. Although set up as a “rotating panel” 
survey, the available data comprise essentially a repeated cross-section as no trac-
ing of individuals over time is possible; however, the same questions are posed to 
a different sample of individuals each time, which means the samples can be com-
pared over time. Besides detailed data on individuals’ labour market status, the 
LFS provides a rich set of information about different socio-demographic charac-
teristics of  both individuals and their respective households, as well as data on job 
and firm characteristics for those having a job. While the dataset is acquired on a 
yearly level it also provides the exact time (year, month, week) the survey is con-
ducted and the exact timing (year, month) of the starting of the current job, thus 
enabling us to determine the incidence of (temporary) employment pre- and post-
EPL reforms. Henceforth, information on a monthly basis extracted from a yearly 
dataset is used in my estimations, applying the appropriate population weights.
The dependent variable(s) follow standard ILO and Eurostat definitions of labour 
market status (Figure 1). This means that the focus is on employees as “individu-
als who work for a public or private employer and who in return receive compen-
sation in the form of wages, salaries, fees, gratuities, payment by results or pay-
ment in kind”, and further to a subgroup of employees “whose main job will ter-
minate either after a period fixed in advance, or after a period not known in 
advance, but nevertheless defined by objective criteria, such as the completion of 
an assignment or the period of absence of an employee temporarily replaced”. 
I exclude self-employed persons and family workers in the main part of the analy-
sis, as is standard in the literature, given that their status is most likely driven by 
completely different factors than those of typical employees. 
The above definition of temporary employment might seem too broad as it 
includes, apart from fixed-term contracts, different forms of seasonal and occa-
sional work. The literature does not have a unanimous ruling on this. For example, 
Tejada (2017) analyses the wider definition of temporary employment in his work 
on Chilean data, which, besides fixed-term contracts, also includes other types of 
contingent jobs such as per task, per-service, and temporal (seasonal) jobs. He 
explains that this is important in the Chilean and other Latin American countries 
17 One could argue that the date of the contract is endogenous as a person is employed based on his/her observ-
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15context due to the high importance of seasonal jobs. Kahn in both his 2007 and his 
2010 paper discusses different definitions of temporary employment in the data he 
uses, i.e., International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) (Kahn, 2007) and European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) (Kahn, 2010), and the one provided by the 
OECD. In general, the OECD definition is closer to the one stated above18, whereas 
Kahn (2007; 2010) conducted his analyses focusing on a narrower definition that 
covers only fixed-term contracts. However, he shows that results are qualitatively 
similar when using a broader definition of temporary employment (Kahn, 2010). 
Consequently, following the definition by the ILO and Eurostat, but also taking 
into account the (seasonal) character of the Croatian labour market19 and the 
impact of globalisation and technology (digitalisation, platform economy), the 
analysis is focused on a broader definition of temporary employment. 
An additional caveat regarding temporary employment based on (Croatian) LFS 
data is worth noting here. Namely, there has been a slight change in the definition 
of temporary employment in 2014 in a way that a portion of workers – working on 
service, author’s or student contract – was reclassified from self-employment to 
temporary (occasional) employment (Figure 2). Nonetheless, between 2013 and 
2014 the share of workers in occasional jobs increased by 0.9 percentage points 
(from 0.5% to 1.4%) among the total number of employees, following a decrease 
of the trend during the crisis (with an average share of 1.1% in the period 2007-
2017). It is evident, however, that this cannot be the sole reason for an increase of 
temporary employment by 2.4 percentage points in the same period (Figure 1) as 
occasional contracts constitute less than 4.5% on average of all temporary con-
tracts in the period 2007-2017 (yet 7.5% after 2014). In addition, other data 
sources (CES and CBS) also point to a rise of temporary employment after 2013. 
All the same, I will also test the findings obtained on a narrower definition, i.e., 
fixed-term contracts only, but also on a broader definition of employment, i.e., 
overall employment that includes the self-employed.
18 Apart from fixed-term contracts, the OECD definition of temporary employment covers temporary agen-
cy workers, daily workers, trainees, people in job creation schemes, workers on contracts for a specific task, 
those on replacement contracts, and on-call workers (OECD, 2002).
19 It has been mentioned earlier that the Government introduced the law in 2012 with the possibility of season-
al work in agriculture via vouchers up to 90 days throughout the year. However, the share of seasonal workers 
among temporary employees actually decreased in 2012 and 2013 before it rose again in 2014-2017 (exclud-
ing 2015, Figure 2), but mainly due to seasonal work in the tourism sector. Other factors, such as different 
forms of youth employment via Government incentives, might have influenced the incidence of temporary 
employment; however, the two incentives (vocational training without commencing employment (temporary 
employment by definition) and employment of youths on permanent contract without the payment of employ-
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16 Figure 2 






























































In estimating the effects of labour legislation reforms on employment outcomes, I 
rely on the rich set of LFS microdata using the core individual characteristics such 
as age (10 5-year age dummies), gender and nationality (if born outside of Croatia), 
but also marriage status and the level of education as covariates (Xit). Although 
Kahn (2010) says that changes in education levels are endogenous with respect to 
employment status and thus does not include the level of education in estimating 
employment probabilities, I believe that education is an important determinant of 
both employment and temporary vs. permanent employment status and thus test 
the model with education variables as well. Additional control variables that are 
included in the estimations are regional residence and the level of urbanisation. 
Although firm-level variables, such as industry or occupational structure, might be 
endogenous, i.e., can be affected by employment protection legislation (Kahn, 
2007; 2010), I also estimate the models including firm characteristics such as the 
size of the firm, public vs. private sector and industry and occupational dummies. 
Namely, as stated elsewhere in the literature, inclusion of industry and occupation 
variables can help control for other factors affecting the incidence of temporary 
employment such as the reduction of adjustment costs (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). 
Basic descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. Even though 
it would be valuable to have some other covariates included in vector X (such as 
past (un)employment histories or individual fixed effects to control for individual 
ability), the list of controls is in line of the variables usually found in the literature.
5 RESULTS
Figure 3 shows the incidence of employment – as a share of total employment and 
employees in the total working-age (15-64) population – and temporary employ-
ment – as a share of total temporary employees and only those on fixed-term 
contract in the total number of employees aged 15-64 – on a monthly level in the 
period 2007-2017, with indications of the months in which EPL reforms occurred. 
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17presented in Figure 1. Although only descriptive, Figure 3 suggests there is a cut-
off in the incidence of temporary employment at the time of labour legislation 
reform, more so in the case of June 2013 (liberalisation of temporary employ-
ment) than in the case of July 2014 (liberalisation of regular contracts). Disruption 
in the case of overall employment is not so obvious; there is a rise in employment 
after 2013 but no evident discontinuity. Furthermore, it seems that prior to EPL 
reforms the trend in the incidence of temporary employment was flat (although 
starting to increase before the first reform when focusing on fixed-term contracts 
only), while the trend in the employment rate was downward sloping (as expected 
in a recession). Although it is hard to make any strong conclusions without further 
analysis, this descriptive inspection would imply that liberalisation of the (tempo-
rary) employment protection in Croatia did not produce evident jump in overall 
employment; however, it did induce a rise in the number of temporary employ-
ment contracts suggesting that the new legislation possibly enabled the replace-
ment of regular employment contracts by those of a temporary nature. 
Figure 3 








































































































Notes: Monthly data are extracted from yearly datasets. No weights are included. Circles repre-
sent share of employed/employees in the total working-age (15-64) population and/or share of 
temporary employees/fixed-term contracts among all employees aged 15-64, while lines repre-
sent local linear smoothing plot.
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18 5.1 EVENT STUDY
In order to further examine descriptive findings, I start with the graphical repre-
sentation of the event study (eq. 3.1 and 3.2) in an attempt to test the assumption 
of there being no differential trends pre-reform, but also to show that there is a 
discrete impact of the EPL reform on the incidence of temporary employment on 
the Croatian labour market (Figure 4). As already mentioned, the date of the 
employment contract is used as time variable (to construct event dummies) and a 
window of eight quarters prior to the reform and eight quarters after the reform, 
evaluating separately reforms of employment protection for temporary contracts 
(June 2013 or q2 2013) and for regular contracts (July 2014 or q3 2014). Follow-
ing Simon (2016), I apply a linear probability model, testing different sets of 
covariates in the model along with event dummies on both temporary employment 
and employee status.
As evidenced in the upper left part of Figure 4, almost all pre-treatment coefficients 
are close to zero and statistically insignificant while post-treatment coefficients are 
all larger than zero and statistically significant. This would suggest that the employ- 
ment protection reform that liberalised temporary contracts (q2 2013) had a sig-
nificant impact on the probability of temporary employment in Croatia. The liber-
alisation of employment protection of regular contracts (reform from the q3 2014), 
shown in the upper right panel, displays somewhat different results. There is a 
visible positive (and significant) post-reform trend; however, although close to 
zero, pre-reform coefficients are also statistically significant. As a result, one can-
not say that this event (labour legislation reform in July 2014) had a significant 
discrete effect on the probability of temporary employment, at least not given the 
event study model results20. However, this is not unexpected given the results for 
the 2013 reform as the positive post-reform effect of that event should be visible in 
the pre-reform period of the 2014 event (4 overlapping quarters), i.e. the reform in 
2014 should be viewed as a cumulative effect on top of the previous (2013) reform. 
In the lower part of Figure 4 the event study results for employment are shown: both 
in the 2013 and in the 2014 reform case the coefficients are close to zero and mostly 
non-significant indicating that labour legislation reforms did not affect the overall 
employment probability for new contracts. This is somewhat surprising as the actual 
goal of the reform was to increase overall employment; however, this result goes 
hand-in-hand with what was already established descriptively (Figure 3). 
Although the presented exercise is here to establish no differential trends in the 
pre-reform period and potential discrete effect of the reform(s), it is worth mention-
ing its several potential shortcomings. First, when analysing the probability of 
20 I show the results on a quarterly instead on a monthly level given that “using more aggregated event dum-
mies reduces noise and makes the pattern of the coefficients smoother” (Simon, 2016: 139). The same results 
estimated on a monthly level are available in the Appendix (Figure A1) where it is obvious that since the esti-
mation contains “thrice as many coefficients with the same number of observations, each individual coeffi-
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19employment, i.e., the probability of becoming an employee, the alternative in this 
case are only those employed (self-employed and family workers) given that only 
they have the information on the ‘start of the contract’. So, the variation in this case 
is limited. Another potential shortcoming is the potential bias of omitting the jobs 
that have expired in the meantime as this approach identifies only those contracts 
that last long enough to be recorded in some subsequent LFS survey. The more 
time has passed, the greater the bias. However, when estimating the same (event 
study) models with limitation on the tenure, very similar results are obtained: the 
size of the coefficients is somewhat smaller, but the trends and statistical signifi-
cance are the same21. In the next section I present more detailed results on the 
determinants of both temporary and overall employment, including EPL reforms. 
Figure 4 
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Note: Results are from linear probability model with robust standard errors. Employment share 
includes only employees (15-64) and not self-employed persons and family workers. Quarterly 
data are extracted from yearly datasets. Regressions control for a basic set of individual char-
acteristics, i.e., age dummies, gender, marriage status and nativity plus time trend and quarter-
ly GDP growth rate. Other model specifications – such as those additionally including educa-
tion, region and level of urbanisation – are also tested and the results are more or less the same 
(available upon request).
Source: Author’s calculation based on Croatian LFS.
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20 5.2 DETERMINANTS OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
The results of the probit regressions (eq. 2) for both temporary employment and 
overall employment (Table 2) are presented next22. Namely – as already men-
tioned – graphical representation of the event study primarily helps in establishing 
flat pre-trends, while probit regressions should work for showing the average 
effect of the EPL reforms on labour market outcomes. Given the non-linearity of 
estimating models in this paper, the results in the form of marginal effects are 
reported, i.e., the average change in the probability of temporary employment or 
employment as the covariate changes (increases) by one unit. I present the results 
of estimations having both reform variables in one model, as well as having them 
separately, bearing in mind that “individual” reform variables represent the cumu-
lative effect of both reforms23. 
The main results suggest that the reform of employment protection for temporary 
contracts (from June 2013) – included in the model together with the EPR liber-
alisation dummy variable (August 2014 - December 2017) – had a positive effect 
on the incidence of temporary employment while the effect on the overall employ-
ment is negative (although insignificant). This result is in congruence with the 
interpretations from the event study (Figure 4) in the case of the effect of June 
2013 reform on total employment (no effect). It is worth mentioning that the effect 
of EPT reform only (dummy for July 2013 – July 2014) is actually positive and 
significant in all the model specifications regarding the probability of temporary 
employment, whereas it remains negative or statistically insignificant in all model 
specifications for total employment (total number of employees)24. Given the rela-
tively short time span (July 2013 – July 2014) and the general economic condi-
tions (recession) it is no surprise that the effect on the probability of overall 
employment remains negative in this period (after controlling for other variables). 
However, positive effect of the reform on the incidence of temporary employment 
suggest the occurrence of two-tier or dual labour market.
Turing to the effect of the EPR reform (dummy for August 2014 – December 
2017), it has a positive effect on the probability of both temporary and overall 
employment, either in the model specification by itself or in combination with the 
EPT reform (Table 2). As already mentioned, this effect cannot be viewed only as 
an EPR reform since it came after the EPT liberalisation had already happened 
only a year before. In effect, this variable shows the influence of both reforms on 
the probability of employment (temporary employment), with the effect being 
stronger in the case of overall employment. Interestingly, the EPR reform variable 
22 Table 2 presents the preferred model specification, while other model specifications are available in Appen-
dix and/or upon request.
23 For example, the second reform dummy variable (August 2014-December 2017) also includes the ‘cumu-
lative effect’ as the reform came in on top of the first (from June 2013) reform. In addition, the results of the 
reform variables modelled as dummies are presented here; however, using EPL indices (Table 1) instead of 
dummy variables gives qualitatively the same results (available upon request). Additionally, I have estimated 
all the models using linear probability regressions and the obtained results are much the same as those pre-
sented here (available upon request).
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21exhibits a stronger influence (the size of the coefficient is larger) on the probability 
of temporary employment in the model that includes EPT reform variable as well, 
further suggesting that this variable is probably picking up the reform that hap-
pened a year before and liberalised temporary contracts. In the case of overall 
employment, the effect of the EPR reform variable is slightly stronger in the 
model including only this variable (after July 2014).
Finally, combining both reforms into one dummy variable (July 2013 – December 
2017), one can see a positive effect of the EPL reforms on both temporary and 
overall employment, with the effect being somewhat stronger for temporary 
employment in this case (Table 2). Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the per-
manent contract reform variable (August 2014 – December 2017) seems to be 
stronger than the effect of both temporary and permanent contract reform varia-
bles combined (July 2013 – December 2017) in the case of both temporary and 
overall employment (Table 2). In any case, it is plausible that the liberalisation of 
permanent contracts seems to have induced the rise in overall employment; how-
ever, the indication that liberalisation of temporary employment might have a 
negative or no effect on overall employment demands further attention.
Table 2 
Marginal effects after probits – temporary employment among employees and 
employment (employees) for population aged 15-64 
Marginal effects
Temporary employment  
(within employees)










































Notes: Besides the reform variables presented, these model specifications include a basic set of 
individual characteristics, i.e., age dummies, gender, marriage status, nativity and education 
level, plus urbanisation and region dummies as well as time trend and quarterly GDP growth 
rate. Employment share includes only employees (15-64) and not self-employed persons and 
family workers. More detailed information on probit regressions, including other model specifi-
cations, is available in the Appendix and upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Author’s calculation based on Croatian LFS.
In addition, the obtained results suggest that females, youths, foreigners, the low-
skilled and singles from rural areas are more likely to end up on temporary con-
tracts, which is in congruence with other findings in the literature (e.g., Kahn, 
2007 or Matković, 2013). Adding regional dummies, linear time trend and GDP 
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22 firm-level variables (size, ownership, occupation and industry dummies) further 
loosens the effect of reform variables on temporary employment; however, the 
main conclusions remain the same (Table A2 in Appendix). 
Although the theoretical predictions from the literature (Bentolila, Dolado and 
Jimeno, 2019) would imply that the stricter the temporary employment provisions 
relative to permanent ones the lower the incidence of temporary employment25, 
the results presented tend to suggest the opposite. However, there are studies (e.g., 
Booth, Dolado and Franck, 2002b, Kahn, 2007; Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet, 
2016) which suggest that employment protection legislation regarding temporary 
employment actually does not affect the incidence of temporary jobs on the labour 
market, but instead that regulation of permanent contracts is the one that matters26. 
In essence, the findings obtained suggest that it is not only easing of temporary 
employment that has played a determining role in the strong increase of temporary 
employment in Croatia: permanent employment protection reform too has affected 
the rise in temporary work.
It is worth recalling that the reforms of temporary and permanent contracts in 
Croatia appeared consequently one after another (during one year) which means 
that perhaps the effect of the changes regarding temporary contracts (from June 
2013) needed more time to come into full effect and thus the result of that reform 
is actually visible in the permanent contract reform (July 2014) as well. In addi-
tion, perhaps the overall flexibilisation of the legislation contributed to a more 
widespread use of temporary contracts. The Blanchared and Landier (2002) 
model, for example, predicts that with EPT liberalisation firms will be more likely 
to hire new workers on temporary contracts to learn about their productivity; how-
ever, they will also be less likely to keep them in regular jobs. There is also the 
possibility that due to the long-lasting recession employers have been (and are) 
still reluctant to employ workers on permanent contracts and thus there is an 
increase of temporary employment in the aftermath of the recession despite the 
liberalised permanent employment protection. Finally, I rely on OECD indices of 
employment protection legislation to indicate whether the reform actually hap-
pened; however, there are suggestions that the reform of permanent contracts hap-
pened only ‘on paper’ while in reality the provisions regulating regular employ-
ment stayed more-or-less the same (CNB, 2014; Potočnjak, 2014).
It was mentioned in the previous section that there is a possibility that individuals 
are selected in a non-random manner into (activity) employment. Applying 
25 The same model predicts that in the case when restrictions for permanent and temporary contracts are similar 
(the same), the easing of the former will lead to more permanent contracts as well as to more fixed-term con-
tracts. All the same, this theory predicts that liberalisation of the permanent contracts would lead to a reduc-
tion of the share of temporary employment on the labour market in the end (Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 
2019), which is not what the obtained results here show.
26 For example, Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2016) in their theoretical model show that the protection of 
permanent jobs does not have an important effect on total employment; however, it does induce the substitu-
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23Heckman correction for selection and using the share of dependent persons (<15 
and >64 years of age) in the household as an ‘instrument’ in the selection equation 
(1st stage) suggests that the selection into (activity) employment is significant, 
with rho coefficient (the correlation between the regression equation and the 
selection equation) being negative proposing that those people who are less likely 
to be in employment (labour market) are more likely to have a temporary con-
tract27. However, controlling for selection does not change the main findings from 
above (Table 2); the coefficients for the reform variables are slightly higher in the 
case of temporary employment and slightly lower in the case of total employment 
after controlling for selection but the main conclusions remain.
In order to further test whether individuals were perhaps sorted into different 
labour market outcomes after reform(s) I estimated models for the pre- and post-
reform period (for both 2013 and 2014 reform), naturally excluding reform vari-
ables28. Perhaps EU accession did not only induce the change of the labour legisla-
tion; it might have also transformed the Croatian labour market in other ways. 
Free movement of labour is the one thing that became a dominant force for Croa-
tian workers as migration outflows to EU countries increased considerably after 
July 2013. This could have affected the results in this paper as it possibly changed 
the composition of the domestic labour market since those who emigrated and 
those who have stayed probably do not have the same characteristics. However, 
the obtained results suggest that there are no important differences in the coeffi-
cients obtained pre and post reform(s): females, youths, foreigners, the low-skilled 
and singles from rural areas are more likely to end up on temporary contracts both 
pre and post reform(s) (similar as in Matković, 2013), with notable exceptions of 
the significance of urbanisation variable only in the post-reform period. 
To sum up, although the event study model implied that employment protection 
legislation reforms from 2013 and 2014 induced a rise in temporary but not in 
overall employment (Figure 4) with the effect of the 2013 reform being stronger, 
probability regressions including reform effects in the form of dummy variables 
for pre and post-reform suggest that these affected the overall employment figures 
as well29. Namely, it seems that employment protection legislation reforms aimed 
at liberalising labour legislation provisions for both temporary and permanent 
contracts induced not only a rise in temporary employment but consequently also 
an increase in overall employment on the Croatian labour market (Table 2). Con-
trary to theoretical predictions, liberalisation of permanent contracts increased the 
incidence of temporary employment as well. The explanation for this probably 
lies in the fact that due to the overall liberalisation of labour legislation – but also 
due to “recession scars” – employers were more willing to offer temporary 
27 Detailed results available upon request.
28 Detailed results available upon request.
29 It is important to remember that in the event study models I have used specific dummies referring to j periods 
away from the reform but related to the individuals’ employment contract date, whereas in the probit regres-
sions reform variables are just dummies indicating 1 after the reform occurred and 0 before that (not specifi-
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24 contracts, even after permanent contracts had become more flexible as well. As 
expected, the liberalisation of permanent contracts increased overall employment; 
however, it seems that liberalisation of temporary employment might have had no 
or even a negative effect on overall employment. Hence, as permanent contract 
flexibilisation led to an increase in overall employment, only the partial labour 
market reform, concentrated on temporary contracts, can be seen as harmful since 
it increased the share of temporary contracts without increasing the overall 
employment level.
5.3 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
It has been mentioned previously that both the changes in the LFS methodology 
as well as additional legislative changes could have affected the occurrence of the 
increased share of temporary employment on the Croatian labour market as of 
2013 (Figures 1, 2 and 3). Hence, in this section I test several alternative model 
specifications (dependent variable definitions) in order to check whether things 
other than EPL reforms could have influenced the main findings.
First, legislative changes that could have affected the incidence of youth (tempo-
rary) employment are the Law on the Promotion of Employment that introduced 
the use of the ALMP measure inducing temporary (up to a year) employment of 
youth population as of 2012, and the Law on Social Security Contributions that 
encouraged the hiring of youths on permanent contracts as of 2015. Although 
these two legislative changes work in the opposite direction regarding the inci-
dence of (youth) temporary employment, in order to take into account possible 
effects that these changes could have on the main results, following Tomić and 
Žilić (2018) I have estimated models from Table 2 by restricting the sample to the 
population older than 30 (Table 3).
As evidenced in Table 3, estimation of the models on the population aged 30-64 
does not change the main results available in Table 2. The size of the coefficients is 
a bit smaller, while the signs and the significance remain the same30. In addition, 
event study results on the restricted sample (Figure 5) reveal a pattern similar to that 
of the original estimation (Figure 4), with somewhat greater oscillations between the 
size of the coefficients, but with a general conclusion remaining the same. This sug-
gest that the main results (Table 2) are not influenced by youth employment in the 
observed period, or by the legislative changes regarding their employment. 
Second, it has been mentioned that the definition of temporary employment used 
in the previous models might be too broad when discussing the employment pro-
tection legislation reform(s). Therefore, I have also conducted an analysis 
restricted to fixed-term contracts as part of temporary employment. A graphical 
representation of the event study focusing on the incidence of fixed-term contracts 
is presented in Figure 6, while main regression results are available in Table 4.
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26 Figure 6 resembles the upper part of Figure 4; however, even in the case of the 
June 2013 reform (temporary contracts liberalisation) some of the pre-reform 
parameters are statistically significant (although close to zero). The results from 
Table 4 are very similar to those in Table 2 that encompass total temporary 
employment (fixed-term contracts, seasonal and occasional work), with the esti-
mated coefficients being slightly smaller in size in the case of fixed-term contracts 
only. These results suggest that the enacted labour legislation reforms have had an 
impact on the incidence on temporary employment, but somewhat more pro-
nounced when covering all forms of temporary employment than when just con-
centrating on fixed-term contracts.
In order to further test the issues with the definition of temporary employment and 
the change in the methodology in 2014 (switch of some occasional contracts 
between self-employment and temporary employment), Table 4 presents two 
additional estimations in which dependent variables are somewhat differently 
defined. The overall temporary employment is defined as a share among the total 
employment (instead of among the total number of employees) while total 
employment among the active population is taken as the relevant parameter 
instead of the total number of employees. In this way, the developments among 
the self-employed portion of total employment are also taken into account. Com-
paring these results with those in Table 2, one can see that the main conclusions 
remain the same (the only notable exception being the gain of the statistical sig-
nificance for the EPT reform dummy in the case of its negative effect on the prob-
ability of total employment). Although the coefficients are slightly smaller in size, 
one can conclude that both temporary and permanent contracts liberalisation have 
had a positive impact on the incidence of temporary employment, whereas the 
effect of temporary contracts liberalisation on the incidence of overall employ-
ment is not entirely clear. All things considered, the definition of dependent vari-
ables (temporary employment and employment) does not drive the main findings, 
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27Figure 5 
Event study results – temporary employment (upper part) and employment (lower 
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Note: Results are from linear probability model with robust standard errors. Employment share 
includes only employees (30-64) and not self-employed persons and family workers. Quarterly 
data are extracted from yearly datasets. Regressions control for a basic set of individual char-
acteristics, i.e., age dummies, gender, marriage status and nativity plus time trend and quarterly 
GDP growth rate. Other model specifications – such as those additionally including education, 
region and level of urbanisation – are also tested and the results are more or less the same (avail-
able upon request).
Source: Author’s calculation based on Croatian LFS.
Figure 6 
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Note: Results are from linear probability model with robust standard errors. Quarterly data are 
extracted from yearly datasets. Regressions control for basic set of individual characteristics, i.e., 
age dummies, gender, marriage status and nativity plus time trend and quarterly GDP growth rate. 
Other model specifications – such as those additionally including education, region and level of 
urbanisation – are also tested and the results are more-or-less the same (available upon request).
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28 6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the effects of employment protection legislation reforms 
from 2013 and 2014 on employment outcomes in Croatia, testing the theoretical 
predictions of two-tier labour market reforms on labour market outcomes from the 
literature. With a push from the EU accession and the need to harmonize legisla-
tion, the reforms liberalized EP provisions for both temporary (2013) and perma-
nent (2014) contracts thus presenting a particularly interesting case for policy 
evaluation. Using the LFS data in the period 2007-2017 and applying the event 
study method in combination with probit regressions, the main results suggest that 
employment protection legislation reforms from 2013 and 2014 induced a rise in 
temporary employment, while the effects on the overall employment are clearly 
visible only in the case of the second (permanent contracts) reform. Thus, it seems 
that the liberalisation of permanent contracts has led to an increase in overall 
employment, while only partial EPL reform concentrated on temporary contracts 
was actually detrimental, as it induced an increase of the share of temporary con-
tracts without increasing the overall employment level. In addition, probit regres-
sion estimations suggest that specific groups of the population – females, youths, 
foreigners, the low-skilled and singles from rural areas – have a higher probability 
of ending up with temporary contracts. These results are further tested applying 
different model specifications, but also focusing on different definitions of tempo-
rary employment; however, they largely confirm the basic set of results.
Nevertheless, there are some caveats that need to be taken into account here. For 
example, I have concentrated on the OECD indices of employment protection 
legislation to indicate whether the reform actually happened; however, these indi-
ces might not be entirely representative of how the things actually work in prac-
tice. This is especially true for the flexibilisation of permanent contracts (2014 
reform). Moreover, labour legislation includes provisions other than the Labour 
Act that could have affected some of the changes on the Croatian labour market in 
recent years. However, alternative model specifications that have tried to take into 
account possible effects of other legislative changes did not change the main find-
ings. Finally, the recession – with the accompanying processes of globalisation 
and digitalisation – and the consequent accommodation of both employers and 
workers could have changed the importance of temporary vs permanent work on 
the Croatian labour market.
Still, one must not disregard the effects that the labour legislation reform had on 
the incidence of temporary employment and on the overall trends on the Croatian 
labour market. This is not only the case for different forms of employment, but it 
can have larger effects on the formation of human capital, increasing inequalities, 
and even further encouraging outward migration. Sound policy evaluation, both 
ex-ante and ex-post, is notably absent in Croatia, while at the same time legisla-
tion is constantly changing. As the labour legislation reforms from 2013 and 2014 
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29regulations with those of the EU, the lessons learned in the case of Croatia might 
be valuable for candidate and future accession countries. 
Further steps in the analysis of the impact of labour legislation on labour market 
outcomes in Croatia should also focus on other outcomes on the labour market, 
such as labour market participation or wages, as well as on individual outcomes 
that could have been affected by the increased incidence of temporary employ-
ment, including the formation of marriage, having children, homeownership and/
or living with one’s parents. As the analysis in this paper showed that specific 
groups of workers, such as youths or females, are more likely to end up on tempo-
rary employment contracts more focus should be put on those specific groups as 
well. Perhaps it is the decisions on the supply side and not on the demand side that 
drive the overall results. In addition, although rich in the number of individual and 
labour market related variables, the LFS dataset might not be the best source of 
data for examining the effects of labour legislation reforms on labour market out-
comes. Another possibility is the use of administrative data with detailed specifi-
cations of different types of contract and their duration, while another approach 
could be the use of firm-level data to check if legislation provisions induced 
changes in the type of employment contracts among different sectors, firm sizes 
and similar matters. In any case, this is too important to be disregarded in aca-
demic discourse.
Disclosure statement 
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Total Employed Employees Temporary 
employees
Mean Std. Dv. Mean Std. Dv. Mean Std. Dv. Mean Std. Dv.
Labour market status
Active 0.65 0.48
Employees 0.47 0.50 0.83 0.38
Self-employed 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Temporary 
employees 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.36
Fixed-term 
contracts only 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.85 0.35
Precarious 
employment 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.33 0.47
Age
15-19 (ref.) 0.09 0.28 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.20
20-24 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.19 0.40
25-29 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.24 0.43
30-34 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.16 0.37
35-39 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31
40-44 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.28
45-49 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.26
50-54 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.23
55-59 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.18
60-64 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.10
Individual/household characteristics
Female 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50
Married 0.59 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.66 0.47 0.43 0.50
Foreign 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31
Share of dependent 
persons in the 
household
0.14 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.17
Education
Low skilled (ref.) 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31
Medium skilled 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.68 0.46
High skilled 0.17 0.37 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41
Area variables
Urban 0.61 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.60 0.49
Central Croatia 
(w/o Zagreb) (ref.) 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41
East Croatia 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40
Zagreb region 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.42
North Adriatic 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34
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34 Area
Variables
Total Employed Employees Temporary 
employees




0.19 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.08
State of the economy
GDP growth rate 
(qoq) 0.05 1.21 0.05 1.23 0.06 1.22 0.17 1.12
GDP growth rate 
(yoy) 0.34 3.46 0.36 3.51 0.41 3.48 0.82 3.27
Firm characteristics
Public sector 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.21 0.41
Small firm (ref.) 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.47
Medium firm 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.37
Large firm 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.16 0.37
Occupation (Managers – ref.)
Professionals 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.32
Technicians 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32
Clerks 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.31
Service & sales 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44
Agriculture 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09
Craftsmen 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33
Plant/machine 
operators 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32
Elementary 
occupations 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.35




0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.13
Manufacturing 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39




tion and food ser-
vice activities + 
communication
0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49
Financial, 
insurance and real 
estate activities




health and social 
work activities
0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.15 0.36
Other services 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31
Observations 275,034 148,022 120,705 18,362
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39Figure a1 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability model with robust standard errors. Employment share 
includes only employees (15-64) and not self-employed persons and family workers. Monthly 
data are extracted from yearly datasets. Regressions control for basic set of individual charac-
teristics, i.e., age dummies, gender, marriage status and nativity plus time trend and quarterly 
GDP growth rate. Other model specifications – such as those additionally including education, 
region and level of urbanisation – are also tested and the results are more-or-less the same (avail-
able upon request).
Source: Author’s calculation based on Croatian LFS.
